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ALAN MAYS and MOUNTAIN STATES 
INSULATION CORP., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
i Case No. 880204 
i Category 14(b) 
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Defendants/respondents Alan Mays ("Mays") and 
Mountain States Insulation Corporation ("MSI"), by and 
through their counsel of record, submit the following brief. 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to 
Article VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution of Utah and §78-2-2 
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), and Rule 3 of the Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court. This is an appeal taken from a final 
order of Judge J. Phillip Eves after a hearing on respondents1 
Motion for Summary Judgment in the Fifth Judicial District 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court was 
correct in ruling that since Mays and MSI were "employees" of 
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation ("Owens-Corning") for 
purposes of the Workers1 Compensation Act, Mays and MSI were 
entitled to the benefit of the exclusive remedy provision of 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 and not subject to suit by appellant. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
This Court's interpretation of the following statutes 
is determinative of the issue on review and these statutes are 
set out verbatim in Addendum "A" of the addenda to this Brief. 
1. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-42 (1953 as amended). 
2. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 (1953 as amended). 
3. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-62 (1953 as amended) 
STATEMENT AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a negligence action by an Owens-Corning 
employee against MSI, a subcontractor of Owens-Corning, and 
an employee of MSI, for injuries received in an on-the-job 
accident. Mays and MSI filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
based on the exclusive remedy provision of Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-60. Riddle filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted, and 
appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Riddle was an employee of Owens-Corning, 
hired to construct a storage warehouse and assist in the 
installation of insulation. (Clerk1s Record Index ["R."] 376 
pp. 15-16, attached as Addendum "B"). 
2. Mays was an employee of Owens-Corning, hired 
to assist in construction of a storage warehouse and in the 
installation of insulation. (Clerk's Record Index ["R."] 376 
p. 17, attached as Addendum "B", and R. 310). 
3. Owens-Corning was a contractor at the 
Intermountain Power Project ("IPP") in Delta, Utah, hired 
to construct a storage warehouse and install insulation. (R. 
376 pp. 15-16, attached as Addendum "B", and R. 310). 
4. Owens-Corning subcontracted with MSI to 
provide labor to erect the storage warehouse. (R. 376 p. 18, 
attached as Addendum "B", and R. 310). 
5. After Mays had been with Owens-Corning for 
three weeks, he and all Owens-Corning employees, except Riddle 
and one other man, were terminated. (R. 376 p. 18, attached as 
Addendum "B"). 
6. MSI then hired Mays as a laborer to help 
construct the storage warehouse and Mays continued doing the 
same work for MSI that he had done for Owens-Corning. (R. 
376 pp. 17-19, attached as Addendum "B"). 
7. Riddle continued to be employed by 
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Owens-Corning and supervised the work done by MSI and its 
employees in erecting the storage warehouse. (R. 376 pp. 
19-22, attached as Addendum "B"). 
8. Riddle was sitting in a parked truck when he 
was hit by a truck driven by Mays. (R. 323). 
9. It is undisputed that both men were working 
when the accident occurred. (R. 323). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is the law in the State of Utah that a 
co-employee cannot maintain a civil action against another 
co-employee. Riddle and Mays began their employment with 
Owens-Corning and were in every respect co-employees. Mays 
then began performing the same duty with MSI and continuing 
to be supervised by Riddle. This change by Mays did not 
eliminate the co-employee relationship. 
Allowing Riddle to maintain a negligence action 
against Mays, while at the same time not allowing Mays to 
maintain such a civil action against Riddle if Riddle were 
negligent, defies the whole concept of fairness and should not 
be allowed. The Supreme Court has determined that if Mays had 
been injured by Riddle, Mays could not maintain a civil action 
against Riddle. This Court's decision was made after an 
amendment to the Workers' Compensation Act narrowed the benefit 
of this exclusive remedy to those occupying an 
-4-
employer-employee relationship. Because the statutory 
employer-employee language of the Workers1 Compensation Act 
still applies, the policy behind the Workers1 Compensation Act 
dictates that Riddle and Mays should be immune from civil suit 
against one another. 
Finally, Riddle maintains that a genuine issue of 
fact exists regarding Owens-Coming's control over MSI. 
This control issue was answered to the trial court's 
satisfaction by appellant's own explanation of the facts. 
Appellant cannot refute his own testimony and Owens-Corning's 
control over MSI is no longer an issue in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-60 PROVIDES THE ONLY 
REMEDY AVAILABLE TO APPELLANT IN THIS CASE. 
When Mays first began working at IPP he was 
employed by Owens-Corning and was a co-employee with Riddle. 
After Owens-Corning subcontracted with MSI for the work being 
done by Riddle and Mays, Mays began receiving his paycheck from 
MSI while continuing to do the same work he did when he 
received a paycheck from Owens-Corning. Riddle continued in 
his employment with Owens-Corning and supervised the work of 
MSI and Mays. 
The Utah Supreme Court has determined in Bambrough 
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v, Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, 1291 (Utah 1976) that "a worker 
can be hired and paid by a subcontractor, but still be an 
employee of the general contractor." Following the Court's 
rationale in Bethers, Mays began work at IPP as an actual 
employee of Owens-Corning and because his duties did not change 
when MSI became the subcontractor for Owens-Corning, Mays is 
still an employee of Owens-Corning. The Court in Bethers 
went on to say that if an employee has the same employer as 
another employee, "he is entitled to and must accept workmen's 
compensation and cannot maintain an action against either of 
them [the employer or another employee of the same employer] 
for negligence in causing his injuries." Id. at 1289. See 
also, Gallegos v. Stringham, 442 P.2d 331 (Utah 1968) 
(plaintiff and defendant held to be working for the same 
employer and therefore plaintiff cannot recover outside 
workers' compensation). 
Respondents' position is supported by the following 
language in Utah Code Ann., §35-1-60 (1953 as amended) 
("Section 60"): 
The right to recover compensation pursuant 
to the provisions of this title for 
injuries sustained by an employee, whether 
resulting in death or not, shall be the 
exclusive remedy against the employer and 
shall be the exclusive remedy against any 
officer, agent or employee of the 
employer and the liabilities of the 
employer posed by this Act shall be in 
place of any and all other civil liability 
whatsoever at common law or otherwise. . . . 
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(Emphasis added). Section 60 does not say that this exclusive 
remedy of the Workers1 Compensation Act is available only 
against the actual employer or actual employee of the 
employer. That section merely states that this exclusive 
remedy is available against the employer or employee of the 
employer. Because Riddle and Mays are co-employees of 
Owens-Corning, Section 60 gives Mays immunity from civil suit. 
Also, because no civil suit can be maintained against Mays, 
Riddle has no theory for bringing a civil claim against MSI. 
Therefore, the denial of appellant's claims against respondents 
by the trial court was proper and should be upheld by this 
Court. 
POINT II 
THE POLICY OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT SHOULD NOT 
ALLOW AN EMPLOYEE OF THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR TO SUE THE 
SUBCONTRACTOR OR AN EMPLOYEE OF THE SUBCONTRACTOR. 
The primary purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act 
("Act") was to: 
eliminate the uncertainty, the time, effort 
and expense involved in the old system 
which required an injured employee to prove 
negligence of his employer as a 
prerequisite to any recovery, and to create 
a system whereby the injured employee would 
be assured of medical and hospital care, 
and a certain though modest compensation 
for injuries and disabilities suffered, 
with the attendant benefits to themselves, 
their families, and to society generally, 
including the stabilizing effect upon the 
economy. 
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Smith v, Alfred Brown Company, 493 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah 
1972). Thus, the Act was designed to insure that an injured 
employee would be compensated for any work-related injury. 
"Employee" is defined as follows in Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-42 (1953 as amended) ("Section 42") as not only an 
employee of the same employer in the ordinary sense, but also 
more broadly to include subcontractors and employees of 
subcontractors: 
If any person who is an employer procures 
any work to be done wholly or in part for 
him by a contractor over whose work he 
retains supervision and control, and this 
work is a part or process in the trade or 
business of the employer, the contractor, 
all persons employed by him, all 
subcontractors under him and all persons 
employed by any of these subcontractors, 
are considered employees of the original 
employer. 
This broadening of the definition of "employee" effectuates the 
policy behind the Act of providing insurance for an employee's 
work-related injuries. Thus, if an employer hires a 
subcontractor over whose work he "retains supervision and 
control," and the work "is a part or process in the trade or 
business of the employer," the subcontractor and all employees 
of the subcontractor are considered employees of the original 
employer, or "statutory employees" for purposes of the Workers' 
Compensation Act. Bennett v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 
726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986). 
Appellant argues that the 1975 amendments to Utah 
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Code Ann, §35-1-62 (Section 62) make the provisions of Section 
42 not applicable to determining which employers are immune 
from third-party suits. However, appellant concedes that if 
Mays had been injured by the negligence of appellant, Mays 
would not be allowed compensation outside of the Act because of 
the current Utah case law on this issue as outlined in Hinds 
v. Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc., 577 P.2d 561 (Utah 1978). See 
appellant's Brief at pp. 17-18. In Hinds, Hughes was an 
independent subcontractor who constructed a building for the 
general contractor. Hughes contracted with Hayes to construct 
the masonry walls in the building. The plaintiff, Hinds, was 
an employee of Hayes and was injured in an on-the-job 
accident. 
Appellant attempts to distinguish Hinds from the 
case at bar by referring to Mays as a "downstream" employee. 
Appellant contends that because Riddle was injured by a 
"downstream" employee, he should be allowed to maintain a civil 
action. This argument ignores the whole concept of fairness as 
outlined in Smith v. Alfred Brown Company, 493 P.2d 994 (Utah 
1972). In Smith, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows: 
It would be quite inconsistent with our 
ideas of even-handed justice to apply a 
liberal interpretation of the Act in order 
to assure coverage to employees, but if it 
appears that there is other coverage, to 
then reverse the policy and apply a 
restricted view to exclude coverage in 
order to allow an employee to sue an 
employer. We think the ends of justice 
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will best be served and the beneficial 
purposes of the Act will be best 
accomplished for employees and employers 
alike, if the statute is applied in an 
uniform manner, whomever1s rights may be 
at stake. 
:Ed.at 995. Thus, what appellant requests the Court to do in 
this instance is allow them to pursue a civil suit against Mays 
when appellant in fact admits that if Mays had been injured by 
the negligence of appellant, no such suit would be allowed 
under current Utah law. 
Appellant also contends that dicta in Shupe v. 
Wasatch Electric Co., 546 P.2d 896 (Utah 1976) controls this 
appeal. While Shupe was decided after the 1975 amendment 
to Section 62, the case arose prior to this amendment and the 
amendments had no bearing on the Shupe decision. In fact, 
the Justice who provided the dicta relied on by appellant in 
his brief had a dissenting opinion in Hinds. The majority in 
Hinds rejected the dissenting Justice's interpretation of the 
1975 amendments to Section 62 and determining that Section 42 
should still be used to define employer for purposes of 
determining immunity from civil suit. Because Hinds has 
remained good law in Utah for over ten years, it should not now 
be overturned based on a dissenting opinion and dicta from an 
earlier case. 
The language in the 1975 amendment to Section 62 and 
the applicable case law decided since that amendment does not 
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support appellant's position that a civil suit can now be 
maintained. The applicable portions of Section 62 now read as 
follows: 
When any injury or death from which 
compensation is payable under this title 
shall have been caused by the wrongful act 
or neglect of a person other than an 
employee, officer, agent, or employee of 
said employer, the injured employee, or in 
case of death his dependants, may claim 
compensation and the injured employee or 
his heirs or personal representative may 
also have a action for damages against such 
third person . . . . 
For purposes of this section and not 
withstanding the provisions of Section 
35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs 
or personal representative may also 
maintain an action for damages against 
subcontractors, general contractors, 
independent contractors, property owners or 
their lessees or assigns, not occupying an 
employee-employer relationship with the 
injured or deceased employee at the time of 
his injury or death. 
This amendment did away with the language, "not in 
the same employment," and replaced it with the language, 
"person other than an employer." The Court in Hinds 
considered this amendment and stated that the amendment: 
enables an employee to sue a tort-feasor 
not his employer (or the employer's agent, 
etc.), [i.e. 'employer' as defined in 
Section 42 which includes 'statutory 
employer'] even though the injured person 
and the tort-feasor may be engaged in the 
same employment. 
Id. at p. 562. The Supreme Court in Hinds recognized that 
the employer-employee definitions as outlined in Section 42 
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should still be used to determine whether an employer-employee 
relationship existed. This amendment did away with overbroad 
language that had precluded civil suits in the past and 
replaced that language with the more narrow definitions found 
in Section 42. Finally, the 1975 amendment does not have the 
effect of insulating everyone at the work place from civil 
liability as appellant contends. With this amendment and its 
subsequent interpretation in Hinds outlined above, only 
employers and employees meeting the requirements of Section 42 
receive immunity from civil liability. 
Appellant contends that the language, 
"notwithstanding the provisions of Section 35-1-42," in the 
1975 amendment to Section 62 removes the application of the 
concept of statutory employer from this section. However, this 
contention presents difficulties in reconciling such language 
with the remaining language of Section 62. Section 62 goes on 
to state that only those who are not occupying an 
"employee-employer relationship may maintain a civil action." 
Thus, the definitions in Section 42 must be applied to 
determine an employer-employee relationship. The intent of the 
1975 amendment to Section 62 was not to abrogate civil immunity 
on behalf of "statutory employers," but to confine that 
immunity to only those employers as defined in Section 42. 
Again, respondents' position is supported by the Hinds 
decision discussed earlier, which interpreted the 1975 
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amendment to Section 62. Also, accepting appellant's position 
on this amendment would require MSI to pay workers' 
compensation premiums for the employees of every subcontractor 
working side-by-side with MSI on a given work site in order 
for MSI to protect itself from civil liability for any injury 
to employees of other subcontractors caused by MSI employees. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed, that the Utah 
Workmen's Compensation Act is designed both to provide swift 
and certain compensation to employees and for: 
the correlated important purpose of 
assuring employers that if they provide 
this protection for their employees, the 
employers will themselves be protected 
against the possibility of exorbitant 
claims for injuries. 
Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 493 P.2d at 995. It makes no 
sense to afford limited liability to entities qualifying as 
statutory employers under the Workmen's Compensation Act, while 
denying such limited liability to subcontractors and others 
working on a site with an injured employee who have much less 
control over, and even less contact with, the injured employee 
than the protected statutory employer has. 
POINT III 
THE "LOANED SERVANT DOCTRINE" PRECLUDES 
RIDDLE FROM SUING EITHER MSI OR MAYS. 
The "loaned servant doctrine" applies to a situation 
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in which one employee of an employer works so closely with the 
employees of another employer to effectuate the second 
employer's purpose that the employee is said to be "loaned" to 
the second employer. The effect of this doctrine precludes the 
loaned employee from suing the second employer. 
The case of Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 
(Utah 1976) illustrates this loaned servant doctrine. In 
Bethers, the plaintiff employee was employed by D & L 
Corporation, the first employer, as a truck driver. Bethers, 
the second employer, contracted with D & L Corporation to load 
wood from Bethers' truck to a D & L Truck, and to haul the 
load to Colorado. Plaintiff was assigned to load the wood and 
haul it and plaintiff was told to work according to the 
procedures of the second employer. In the process of operating 
a forklift to load the wood onto the second truck, plaintiff 
was badly injured. The Court held that Bambrough, the 
plaintiff, was a "loaned servant" and therefore the second 
employer's liability to Bambrough was limited to benefits 
under the Act. 
Bambrough argued that the loaned servant doctrine 
should not apply because (1) there had been no written contract 
between the two employers, (2) Bambrough had not consented to 
be loaned to the second employer, and (3) the first employer 
had not surrendered control over his employee to the second 
employer. Bambrough at 1291-92. The Court ruled that: 
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The Utah Workman's Compensation Act does 
not expressly require consent on the 
employee's part to establish the requisite 
relationship, nor is a written contract a 
required formality for workmen's 
compensation purposes under the laws of 
Utah. 
Bambrough at 1291. In addition, the Court stated: "it has 
never been held by this Court that for the loaned servant 
doctrine to apply, the original employer must completely 
surrender all control over his loaned employee." Bambrough 
at 1292. The Court focused on the effect of the working 
arrangement and discounted the significance of individual 
elements. 
Applying the effect of the working arrangement 
between the parties in the instant case, Riddle was a "loaned 
servant" and employed by Owens-Corning to work with MSI 
employees on the construction of a storage warehouse. Because 
of this close working relationship with MSI and Mays, 
Riddle's ability to recover against respondents should be 
limited to benefits under the Act. 
POINT IV 
NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS REGARDING 
THE ISSUE OF OWENS-CORNING'S CONTROL OVER MSI. 
Appellants argue that a genuine issue of fact exists 
as to Owens-Coming's control over MSI. However, it should 
be pointed out that at the trial court level, respondents 
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presented evidence from Riddle's deposition to show that Riddle 
had supervision and control over respondents. Riddle 
specifically stated in his deposition that he supervised and 
controlled what was done on the job site by MSI. Thus, the 
issue of control having been answered by appellant himself, the 
trial court correctly determined that no genuine issue of 
material fact existed with regard to this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah case law, as it has interpreted the 1975 
amendment to Section 62, specifically precludes those in a 
statutory employer-employee relationship from bringing civil 
actions against one another. While appellant admits that Mays 
could not bring a civil action against Riddle had he been the 
injured party in this case, appellant asks the Court to allow 
him to bring a civil action against Mays despite the statutory 
employer-employee relationship. The concept of fairness, as 
espoused in previous Utah Supreme Court cases, requires that 
this exclusive remedy of the Workers1 Compensation Act be 
applied uniformly no matter which party's rights are at stake. 
Thus, because Riddle and Mays are essentially co-employees as 
defined under Section 42 and the applicable case law, Riddle is 
precluded under Section 60 from bringing a civil action. In 
addition, Riddle's only claim against MSI is through Mays and 
given the fact that no claim outside the Workers' Compensation 
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Act exists against Mays, no such claim would exist against 
MSI. 
Appellant's contention that applying the 1975 
amendment to Section 62 in the manner espoused by respondents 
and as applied by the Utah Supreme Court would give every 
individual on the job site immunity from civil suit is wholly 
without merit. Obviously, the provisions of Section 42 
governing the statutory employer-employee relationship would 
still need to be met regarding supervision and control and part 
or process in the same trade or business to obtain immunity 
from civil suit. 
Finally, by appellant's own admission, he supervised 
the work being done by respondents and because appellant was 
employed directly by Owens-Corning, Owens-Corning's control 
over respondents is imputed through the actions of appellant. 
For these reasons, respondents respectfully request that this 
Court affirm the lower court's decision to grant summary 
j udgment. 
DATED this 1988. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
NELSON ^ T HAYES ^ 
SUSAN P. DYER 
LLOYD A. HARDCASTLE 
Attorneys for Alan Mays and 
Mountain States Insulation Corp. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
J& 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was mailed on this J^V^day of 
'&£~£*PUi&4Z/^ , 1988 to the following counsel of record: 
GORDON K. JENSEN 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500 
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;5.]-f2. Employers enumerated and defined -
Regularly employed - Independent contractors. 
7nc following consiiiuic employers subject to the 
provisions of this title: 
(1) The state, and each county, city, town, and 
school district in the state. 
(2)(a) Every person, firm, and corporation, incl-
uding every public utility, having in service one or 
more workmen or operatives regularly employed in 
;nc same business, or in or about the same establi-
shment, under any contract of hire, express or 
.mpiiwd, oral or written, except: 
(i) agricultural employers: (A) whose emplo-
yees arc all members of the immediate family of the 
employer, which employer has a proprietary interest 
:n the farm, the inclusion of any immediate family 
member under the provisions of this title being at 
the option of the employer; or (B) who employ five 
or fewer persons other than immediate family 
members for 40 hours or more per week per empl-
oyee for 13 consecutive weeks during any pan of the 
preceding 12 months; and • 
(ii) domestic employers who do not employ 
one employee or more than one employee at least 40 
hours per week. 
(b) Employers of agricultural laborers and 
domestic servants have the right to come under the 
terms of this title by complying with the provisions 
of this title and the rules of the commission. 
ADDENDUM "A" 
(3) As used in this section: 
- (a) 'Regularly" includes all employments in the 
usual course of the trade, business, profession, or 
occupation of the employer, whether continuous 
throughout the year or for only a ponion of the 
year. __ 
(b) Where any employer procures any work to 
be done wholly or in pan for him by a contractor 
over whose work he retains supervision or control, 
and this work is a part or process in the trade or 
business of the employer, the contractor, all persons 
employed by him, all subcontractors under him, and 
all persons employed by any of these subcontrac-
tors, arc considered employees of the original emp-
loyer. . • • ;. • . 
• (c) Any person, firm, or corporation engaged in 
the performance of work as an independent contr-
actor is considered an employer. •.••.•.'• 
(d) . 'Independent contractor' .means any 
person, association, or corporation engaged in the 
performance of any work for another who, while so 
engaged, is independent of the employer in all that 
pcnains to the execution of the work, is not subject 
to the rule or. control of the employer, is engaged 
only in the performance of a definite job or piece of 
work, and is subordinate to the employer only in 
effecting a result in accordance with the employer's 
design. 19&£ 
35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer, 
agent or employee — Occupational disease ex-
cepted. 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for 
injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be 
the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy 
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer and the liabilities of 
the employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil 
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such employee or to his 
spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal rep-
resentatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on account of any 
accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or 
incurred by such employee in the course of or because of or arising out of his 
employment, and no action at law may be maintained against an employer or 
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer based upon any acci-
dent, injury or death of an employee. Nothing in this section, however, shall 
prevent an employee (or his dependents) from filing a claim with the indus-
trial commission of Utah for compensation in those cases within the provi-
sions of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Act, as amended. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 76; C.L. 1917, Utah Occuoational Disease Disability Law, 
§ 3132; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. § 35-2-1 et seq. 
1943, 42-1-57; L. 1949, ch. 52, § 1. Meaning of "this act". — See the note un-
Cross-References. — Employment of chil- der the same catchline following § 35-1-46. 
dren, § 34-23-1 et seq. 
35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of per-
sons other than employer, officer, agent, or em-
ployee of said employer — Rights of employer or 
insurance carrier in cause of action — Mainte-
nance of action — Notice of intention to proceed 
against third party — Right to maintain action 
not involving employee-employer relationship — 
Disbursement of proceeds of" recovery. 
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this 
title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other 
than an employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer, the injured 
employee, or in case of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the 
injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an 
action for damages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and 
the employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, the 
employer or insurance carrier shall become trustee of the cause of action 
against the third party and may bring and maintain the action either in its 
own name or in the name of the injured employee, or his heirs or the personal 
representative of the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may not 
settle and release the cause of action without the consent of the commission. 
Before proceeding against the third party, the injured employee, or, in case of 
death, his heirs, shall give written notice of such intention to the carrier or 
other person obligated for the compensation payments, in order to give such 
person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceeding. 
For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of Sec-
tion 35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may 
also maintain an action for damages against subcontractors, general contrac-
tors, independent contractors, property owners or their lessees or assigns, not 
occupying an employee-employer relationship with the injured or deceased 
employee at the time of his injury or death. 
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be disbursed as 
follows: 
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees, 
shall be paid and charged proportionately against the parties as their 
interests may appear. Any such fee chargeable to the employer or carrier 
is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or, in the 
case of death, by the dependents, for any recovery had against the third 
party. 
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed 
in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of costs and 
attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (1). 
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his heirs in 
case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation 
thereafter accruing against the person liable for compensation. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 72: C.L. 1917, 
§ 3133; L. 1921, ch. 100, § 1; R.S. 1933, 
42-1-5S; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-58; 
L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1: 1971, ch. 76, § 3; 1973, 
ch. 67, § 7; 1975, ch. 101, § 3. 
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1 Q Mark Riddle, Portageville# Missouri. Is he still in 
2 Portageville? 
3 A He's in Wardell. 
4 Q And Linda Joyce Riddle May, Portageville. Is she 
5 still in Portageville? 
6 A She's in Essex. 
7 Q And one or both of those would know how to get a 
8 hold of your first wife; is that right? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q Let me go back with you again. So Owens Corning 
11 informed you that they needed some construction workers to 
12 build a shed; is that what you said? 
13 A Yes. I was sent here to mobilize the job. We had a 
14 start date from T. C. Construction. We had a subcontract. 
15 Q And when you arrived, you were told that additional 
16 people would be needed to build this outbuilding of some kind? 
17 A Warehouse storage. 
18 Q And what was your job then? What was your job 
19 classification? What were you called? 
20 A My job classification with Owens Corning Fiberglass 
21 is carpenter, general foreman. 
22 Q Was that your classification when you came here to 
23 Utah? 
24 A I came here — you can take this off the record if 
25 you want to. Those hoppers in the bag house, we had to set 
16 
one of them up. I'd scaffolded it out completely, and thin 
they sent a sheet metal man off of another job out of Nevada 
over here and took the measurements off of it. See, we 
prefabed every piece of that power house that we installed at 
our factory. And I was sent here to specifically get that one 
scaffold up, the only one, and build a warehouse for storage. 
Q You were kind of the supervisor of the whole thing 
on site? 
A I was the supervisor. 
Q Was there anyone else when you were sent here that 
were Owens Corning employees? 
A No. 
Q Were you supervising anyone is what I'm asking? 
Were you supervising the work of anybody else? 
A No. 
Q And to build this warehouse — 
MR. JENSEN: Nelson, let me ask, when you say was he 
supervising the work of anyone else, what do you mean? 
MR. HAYES: When he arrived here. When he came, was 
he brought here with other people to supervise anybody. 
THE WITNESS: There was no other people except me. 
Q (BY MR. HAYES) And some time subsequent to that, 
you hired Alan Mays and apparently some other people to build 
a warehouse for Owens Corning, I assume? 
A Alan Mays did not come on the job until after the 
17 
warehouse was built. 
Q So he wasn't brought in to construct the warehouse? 
A No. 
Q What was he hired to do, then? 
A He was hired by Mountain States Insulation Company 
as a laborer. 
Q Let me back up with you, I guess I misunderstood 
what you told me. I understood that you told me that you 
hired him to come out from Kansas to work as a laborer, 
construction person in the building of a warehouse for Owens 
Corning. 
A I did. 
Q Why did you tell me that? 
A Because I didn't know what the company had planned. 
They told me to get people on the job, get the scaffold up fo 
measurement. 
Q Okay. 
A I done exactly that. He was employed by Owens 
Corning Fiberglass approximately three weeks. 
Q So he did come out from Kansas at your request and 
was employed with Owens Corning Fiberglass to put up this one 
scaffold for three weeks? 
A I didn't say the one scaffold, he worked 
approximately three weeks. 
Q Putting up the scaffold? 
18 
1 A Moving scaffolding, 
2 Q When was that? 
3 A I don't know. The dates I'm not sure of. 
4 Q In relationship to January of 1985, when was it? 
5 A January of 19 85? In relationship to what? 
6 Q I mean, when was he putting up scaffolding in 
7 relation to January of 19 85? 
8 A In January of 19 85, he didn't work for me, he worked 
9 for Mountain States Insulation. 
10 Q That's what I'm asking. Was it one month before, 
11 two months before? 
12 A Four or five months. 
13 Q And at the end of the three weeks that he worked 
14 under you when you were the foreman, what was his reason for 
15 terminating? 
16 A The company terminated all O.C. employees, except me 
17 and Steve Gabb. 
18 Q Why? 
19 A They hired Mountain States Insulation Company to 
2 0 supply labor. 
21 Q Had you worked with Mountain States Insulation prior 
22 to that time? 
23 A I've never worked for them. 
24 Q I didn't say for them, I said with them. 
2 5 A Never. 
19 
Q Had they been on the job before then? 
A No. 
Q So when they hired Mountain States Insulation, Alan 
Mays went over and worked for them? 
A They put him on their payroll. 
Q Was he doing the same thing he'd been doing working 
for you? 
A Yes, basically. 
Q Were you supervising him? 
A No. 
Q You weren't supervising him? 
A No. 
Q You weren't responsible for what he was doing? 
A I was in a sense. My property manager would tell me 
what work was to be done on what particular part of the power 
house. I had only to go to the foreman of a carpenter, the 
foreman of a laborer and the work was disbursed from there. 
Q Who would you go to that you were aware of that 
would supervise or instruct Mr. Mays? 
A Maynard Crossland was the labor superintendent. 
Q Crossland? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And he was an employee of Mountain States? 




A He owns 30 percent of the Mountain States Insulation 
Company, to my understanding. His brother owns Mountain 
States Insulation Company. 
Q Well, my question is Maynard Crossland was the 
supervisor with Mountain States? 
A Yes. 
Q And you would tell him what had to be done? 
A We would confer, have meetings daily. 
Q Would you oversee what was being done by Maynard 
Crossland and his people? 
A Exactly. That's what I was there for. 
Q You were there to tell them, for instance, how to do 
the work? 
A I was to — 
MR. JENSEN: I'll just object to you telling him 
what he was doing. I don't have a problem with you asking him 
what his responsibility was. 
MR. HAYES: Well, I think he's an adverse witness. 
I think I can probably ask him any way I need to. 
THE WITNESS: Bring that question back. 
Q (BY MR. HAYES) Was it your responsibility to tell 
them how to do the work? 
A If it was wrong, I'd raise the question. I worked 
through Owens Corning for safety, OSHA regulations on erecting 
21 
scaffolding. 
Q But what I'm interested in is were they erecting 
scaffolding? 
A He was a laborer. 
Q Was Alan Mays erecting scaffolding? 
A No. 
Q What was he doing? 
A He was a step and fetch man. He was getting 
scaffolding for carpenters. 
Q And were you on the job when he was performing his 
activities? 
A Yes. 
Q You were there and you would oversee and see what 
was happening? 
A Exactly. 
Q As Mountain States would perform their work? 
A Right. 
Q And if it wasn't being done properly, you had 
authority to require that it be done properly? 
A Exactly. 
Q And you had authority to, as a result of your 
involvement with Owens Corning and your knowledge of OSHA 
regulations and so on and so forth, you had authority to make 
sure that it was done safely? 
A Yes. 
22 
Q And you could tell Mr. Crossland or the people that 
worked under him how to do the work if it wasn't being done 
safely? 
A Yes. 
Q And if it was being done improperly, you could 
require that they do it properly? 
A Yes. 
Q When you were performing that function, did you have 
anyone working under you? 
A No. 
Q And the only other person that was an Owens Corning 
employee was this Steve Gabb? 
A Yes. 
Q What was he doing? 
A He was a sheet metal superintendent. 
Q You were the construction superintendent? 
A Nope. I was carpenter general foreman. I seen to 
and took care of the scaffolding. 
Q So Steve Gabb was performing a different function? 
A Installation of materials. 
Q Was he doing the same thing, as far as supervising 
or overseeing the work of Mountain States Insulation? 
A Exactly. 
Q Who did you report to? 
A Stacy Eskelin. 
